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LEGISLATION-WITNEss IMMUNITY AcT OF 1954-CoNsTITUTIONAL AND INTERPRETATIVE PROBLEMS-The passage in August,
1954 of a federal statute1 granting immunity under specified conditions to witnesses before congressional committees and in the federal
courts marks a third legislative experiment designed to soften the effect
of the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on the investigatory power of
Congress. The first two attempts2 were less than successful. This
comment will discuss the historical background of immunity legislation, and some possible constitutional pitfalls and problems of construction created by the statutory language.

I. The Historical Perspective
In ruling on what was essentially a question of common-law privilege in United States v. Burr,8 Chief Justice John Marshall laid down
some fundamental conditions of the privilege against self-incrimination which remain good law today. He stated, inter alia, that a witness
might properly claim this privilege where his testimony would furnish

18 U.S.C.A (Cum. Supp. 1954) §3486.
211 Stat. L. 156 (1857); 12 Stat. L. 333 (1862).
s (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 2, No. 14,692a-14,694a.
1
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a link in the chain of testimony which might lead to his conviction for
a crime. As late as 1951, Marshall's statement of the law was relied
upon in a decision making a refusal to answer questions concerning
communist affiliation a proper one under the Fifth Amendment. 4
Subsequent cases have added a number of propositions to Marshall's
fairly broad definition of the scope of the privilege. These propositions,
stated with more finality than should necessarily be ascribed to them,
are: (I) The testimony need not be demanded during the trial of an
actual criminal case, but testimony in any form, if compellable, is
within the scope of the protection.5 (2) The testimony sought must
have a tendency to incriminate and not merely to disgrace. 6 (3) The
privilege may be waived voluntarily or may be made meaningless by
a previous pardon, or running of the statute of limitations.7 ( 4) The
privilege must be specifically invoked or it will be deemed waived.8
(5) The privilege extends to forced disclosure of evidence in violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,9 thereby laying a basis
for a theory of mutuality of the two provisions.10 (6) The privilege
cannot be invoked on the ground that the witness might be prosecuted
in a separate sovereignty.11 As a corollary to these principles, it should
be noted that the privilege was not incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to apply to state governmental action, though nearly
every state has such a provision in its own constitution.12
With these doctrines as background, the legislative substitutes for
the privilege may now be considered. Congress' first major experiment with an immunity statute came in 1857, when a statute giving
immunity from prosecution to all witnesses appearing before congressional committees was passed under circumstances indicating hasty consideration.13 Under this statute, which contained no procedural safe4Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223 (1950).
U.S. 547 at 562, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892).
591 at 598, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). For historical
perspective, see Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause," 29 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1930).
7Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 at 597 et seq., 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896).
BRogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438 (1951).
OBoyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886).
10 See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 64 S.Ct. 1082 (1944), esp.
Black, J., dissenting.
11 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931); Jack v. Kansas, 199
U.S. 372, 26 S.Ct. 73 (1905).
1 2 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908). For a recent case
on state immunity legislation, see State v. Abdella, (W.Va. 1954) 82 S.E. (2d) 913.
13 The catalyst for the proposal of the bill was the refusal of a newspaper correspondent, Simonton, to answer questions about alleged bribery of members of Congress by
unnamed persons. He did not claim any privilege against self-incrimination, but rather
5 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
6 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.

860

MrcmGAN LAw REVIEW

[ Vol. 53

guards against "immunity baths," a number of persons escaped prosecution for serious crimes, while the committees which heard their testimony gained no corresponding enlightenment.14
In 1862, the act of 1857 was amended by unanimous vote to limit
immunity to the use of testimony given by a witness. 15 This second
experiment with immunity legislation did not, strictly speaking, provide immunity at all. Rather, it prohibited the introduction of a
witness' testimony against him in a criminal trial, or use of it therein.16
The statute was held (by implication) to be an incomplete substitute
for the constitutional privilege when similar legislation applicable to
grand jury proceedings was tested in Counselman v. Hitchcock. 11
The Supreme Court held that the statute did not provide as broad an
immunity as is necessary to protect a witness' constitutional rights
under the self-incrimination clause. This statute protected the witness
only from the use of his testimony in a direct manner, whereas the
Constitution protected him from any disclosure which might provide
a part of the evidence leading to his conviction. The Court gave the
cue for further legislation, however, saying, "It is quite clear that legislation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replace or supply one, unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in
scope and effect. ..."18 Congress took the cue and applied it the next
year in an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.19 Substantially
the same provision was included in subsequent legislation creating and
governing other federal regulatory bodies.2O
Thus began the third era of immunity legislation. The provision
in the Interstate Commerce Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in
1896 by a bare 5-4 decision in the case of Brown v. Walker. 21 The
rationale of the majority stemmed principally from the dictum in the
Counselman case and was bolstered by this policy consideration:
"The danger of extending the principle announced in Counselman v. Hitchcock is that the privilege may be put forward for a
refused to divulge names because of purely moral considerations of personal confidence.
The bill was passed by an almost unanimous vote after but two days debate in both houses.
See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d sess., pp. 403-445 (1857).
14 CoNG.

GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d sess., p. 428 (1862).
at 431.
10 12 Stat. L. 333 (1862).
11142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892).
18 Id. at 585.
19 27 Stat. L. 443 (1893).
20 See discussion by Frankfurter, J., in his dissent to United States v. Monia, 317
U.S. 424 at 436, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943).
21161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896).
15 Id.
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sentimental reason, or for a purely fanciful protection of the witness against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of securing immunity to some third person, who is interested in concealing the facts to which he would testify. Every good citizen is
bound to aid in the enforcement of the law, and has no right to
permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good name,
to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter
behind his privilege. "22
The Court suggested that the supremacy clause of the Constitution
would prevent the use of the witness' testimony in state prosecutions.
The minority argued that no statute could limit a constitutional privilege should the witness choose the privilege and not the statute. Justice
Field suggested that the amendment was intended to protect a witness
from revealing his past actions in such a way as to disgrace him. 23 The
minority also urged further objections: the possibility of prosecutions
in state courts was not foreclosed by the statute, and the act usurped
the presidential prerogative to grant pardons. 24
There remained some interpretative problems regarding the immunity provisions in statutes similar to the Interstate Commerce Act.
One of significance to the present inquiry arose in 1942 in the case of
United States v. Monia. 25 The case involved this problem: when a
person in obedience to a subpoena appears before a grand jury investigating alleged violations of the Sherman Act and gives testimony substantially touching an offense for which he is later prosecuted, does he
obtain immunity from that prosecution without having claimed his
privilege under the Fifth Amendment before so testifying? The Court
held that the defendant, Mania, was immune, the statute being clear
that after subpoena and oath, the testimony in and of itself would
raise the umbrella of immunity. The effect of the Interstate Commerce Act was distinguished from some of the New Deal regulatory
legislation which included specific provisions limiting immunity to
those cases in which the witness claimed the privilege before testifying.26 Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the ultimate
purpose of immunity provisions in all of the regulatory acts was not to
grant amnesty, but to aid in the enforcement of the criminal law. He
22 Id.

at 600.
at 631.
24 Id. at 610, 622.

23 Id.
25

317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943).
at 429.

26 Id.
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pointed out that in three of the New Deal statutes2 7 the immunity
grant was substantially in the terms of the former provisions (including
the Sherman Act provision), thus negating any specific purpose to
differentiate among them in regard to the procedural prerequisites for
immunity.28
In summary, then, the type of immunity provision appended to
various federal regulatory statutes was held to be a sufficient protection for the person testifying. This was true whether or not he was
required to claim his privilege before being granted immunity. The
importance of decisions under these statutes becomes evident when
their language is compared with the 1954 act.
Fonner §3486 of Title 18, United States Code, the lineal descendant of the 1857 and 1862 acts relating to testimony before congressional committees, remains in the historical background of the 1954
legislation. Under this statute (repealed by the 1954 act), testimony
given by a witness before a committee could not be used in subsequent
prosecutions "in any court." In Adams 11. Maryland29 it was decided
that by force of the phrase "in any court," a state could not introduce
in a state prosecution the testimony of a person given before a congressional committee. The theory of this result was logically outlined as
follows: Congress has power to summon witnesses; the necessary and
proper clause of the Constitution gives Congress power to pass laws
which will effectuate that power; the supremacy clause of the Constitution makes the statutory exercise of the power binding on state courts
so as to prevent the admission of testimony protected by the federal
statute. It should be noted that the Court's decision was based upon
the language of the statute involved. The Fifth Amendment does not
require the same result as to state prosecutions.30
Beginning with the frequent invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege before committees inquiring into matters of security and loyalty, a c;onsiderable amount of dissatisfaction with such use began to
appear in Congress. In January of 1953, Senator McCarran introduced
S. 16.31 In its original form, this bill would, upon an affirmative vote
27Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. L. 550 (1935); Industrial Alcohol Act, 49 Stat. L. 875
(1935); Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. L. 1065 (1938).
28 ''To attnoute caprice to Congress is not to respect its rational purpose when, as here,
we find a uniform policy deeply rooted in history even though variously phrased but
always directed to the same end of meeting the constitutional requirement." Frankfurter,
J., in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 at 446, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943).
29 347 U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442 (1954).
30 See Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 26 S.Ct. 73 (1905).
31 See H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); 99 CoNG. Rec. 265 (1953), for
the substance and permutations of this bill.
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of two-thirds of a committee, have immunized the witness from criminal prosecution on any relevant matters about which he gave testimony. No provision was made for extending immunity to witnesses
testifying in judicial proceedings. It did not provide that the attorney
general be apprised of the proposed grant of immunity, nor for a court
order preceding effectuation of the grant. A later amendment by Senator McCarran provided for notice to the attorney general.
The administration, represented by the attorney general, was not
satisfied with the McCarran bill and approved an alternative proposal
introduced in the House as H.R. 6899 by Representative Keating in
January of 1954.32 This bill was broader in scope than S. 16, in that
it extended the immunity provision to judicial proceedings. In addition, it provided that immunity could not be granted in congressional
proceedings without the assent of the attorney general. This bill did
not contain any provision requiring court approval of the grant.
The bill finally enacted into law was a substitute version drafted
by the House Judiciary Committee. It combined features of the two
major proposals outlined above but contained some unique provisions.
Instead of committee approval alone, or committee approval plus the
assent of the attorney general, the latter official was relegated essentially to an advisory position, while court approval of the committee's
recommendation of immunity was required. Instead of a broad provision relating to witnesses' testimony on any matter, the immunity could
be granted only as to testimony relating to certain criminal acts against
the national defense and security.33 In addition to so limiting the scope
of the statute, Congress also eliminated the restricted testimonial immunity which had been provided by former §3486. The important
portions of the 1954 Witness Immunity Act are set forth below.34
S2 See H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); H. Hearings before Subcommittee
No. 1 0£ the Committee on Judiciary on Internal Security Legislation, 83d Cong., 2d sess.,
p. 149 (1954) (brief 0£ the attorney general).
83 Included in the scope of immunity grantable by a congressional committee: " .•• any
interference with or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger
the national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of its Government by force or violence. • • ."
18 U.S.C.A. (Cum. Supp. 1954) §3486.
34 After providing that no witness shall be excused £rom testifying or producing
evidence before a committee (or either House, or a joint committee) on the ground that
the testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate him, subsection (a)(2) describes the
conditions under which such excuse shall be ineffective in proceedings before a committee:
" ••• that two-thirds of the members of the full committee shall by affirmative vote have
authorized such witness to be granted immunity under this section with respect to the
transactions, matters, or things concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed
his privilege against sel£-incrimination to testify or produce evidence by direction of the
presiding officer and that an order of the United States district court for the district wherein
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II. Constitutional Problems
In the attorney general's brief submitted to the House Judiciary
Committee the supposition is made that no constitutional problems of
any magnitude are raised by the immunity bill endorsed by him, i.e.,
H.R. 6899.35 This supposition appears to be a sound one in view of
the decisions construing former immunity legislation. Although other
grounds of attack may be proposed, it is believed that attention will
center principally on the separation of powers in the national government, the distinction in fundamental purpose between committee investigations and those of regulatory agencies, the reasonableness of the
procedure set up as a substitute for the Fifth Amendment, and the
argument based upon the usurpation of the executive pardoning power.
A. Separation of Powers. The doctrine of separation of powers
appears to be the most serious ground of attack on the statute.36 It will
be seen that the power of Congress to endow courts with something
like administrative duties ( under the necessary and proper clause) is
the inquiry is being carried on has been entered into the record requiring such person to
testify or produce evidence. Such an order may be issued by a United States district court
judge upon application by a duly authorized representative of the Congress or of the
committee concerned. But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is
so compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or
produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal
proceedings (except prosecutions described in subsection (d) hereof) against him in any
court." Prosecutions under subsection (d) here referred to are for contempt or perjury.
Subsection (b) provides: ''Neither house nor any committee thereof nor any joint
committee of the two Houses of Congress shall grant immunity to any witness without
first having notified the Attorney General of the United States of such action and thereafter having secured the approval of the United States district court for the district wherein
such inquiry is being held. The Attorney General of the United States shall be notified
of the time of each proposed application to the United States district court and shall be
given the opportunity to be heard with respect thereto prior to the entrance into the record
of the order of the district court."
Subsection (c) provides for a similar grant of immunity in "any case or proceeding
before any grand jury or court of the United States" on application to the court by the
United States attorney and with the approval of the attorney general. The areas in which
such immunity grant may be made, in addition to those enumerated in subsection (a),
include several specific statutes relating to internal security. The requirement is also included that the testimony be in the judgment of the United States attorney "in the public
interest." A substantive grant of immunity is provided similar to that of subsection (a).
35 See H. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Judiciary on
Internal Security Legislation, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 149 (1954).
36 One aspect of this objection not set forth herein was touched upon by Senators
Lehman and Cooper in debate on the original S. 16. Their attack centered on a theory
that the executive power to administer the criminal law would be obstructed by congressional assumption of power to grant witnesses immunity in particular instances. See 99
CoNG. REc. 8342, 8351 (1953). But since such agencies as the Interstate Commerce
Commission are not purely executive, and since they do not administer the criminal law
per se, query as to the force of this argument.
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at least theoretically at odds with the idea that the executive, legislative,
and judicial functions are separate and that each of these functions is
exercisable only by the department created for this purpose by the
Constitution.37 The usual situation where the separation of powers
question has arisen is in the exercise of so-called quasi-legislative powers by administrative agencies or by the President. It has generally
been held that the exercise of such powers is constitutional if reasonably limited by legislative criteria and necessary to the effectuation of
the legislative purpose. 38 The present problem seldom arises in the
operation of the national government, but it appears that exercise of
administrative powers by a federal district court is not wholly invalid.39
Where it is sought, however, to invest such a court with power to
adjudicate when there is no case or controversy, a contrary result is
reached because of the plain words of article III.4° The instant statute,
in succeeding subsections, seems to present the judiciary with an admixture of administrative and judicial functions. Under subsection
(a), no witness shall be excused from testifying after a recommendation
by a two-thirds vote of a committee that he be granted immunity, provided the record shows "that an order of the United States district
court for the district wherein the inquiry is being carried on has been
entered into the record requiring said person to testify or produce evidence." In subsection (b), it is prescribed that neither the House nor
any committee "shall grant immunity to any witness without first .. .
having secured the approval of the United States district court. . . ."
The substance of these two provisions appears to be in conflict. The
first seems to require the court to decide the rights of the witness
( whether he shall be compelled to testify notwithstanding his privilege); the second may require the court to determine only the propriety
of a grant of immunity. If two different qualities of acts are contemplated by the two subsections-and this is arguable as a matter of inS7THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 47-51. Cf. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 408 (1792),
and note thereto.
38 Compare Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S.Ct. 495 (1892), where the necessary
limiting criteria were held to be present, with Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
55 S.Ct. 241 (1935), where they were held not to be present.
39 See 34 CoL. L. REv. 344 (1934); Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts,'' 43 HARv. L.
REv. 894 (1930). In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911),
the Supreme Court instructed the Court of Claims to dismiss the petition for want of
jurisdiction, on the basis that there was no case or controversy presented, a necessary element to exercise of the judicial power under article III of the Constitution. Since the
Court of Claims is a ''legislative" court, query whether there was necessarily a want of
jurisdiction in that tribunal. Cf. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 at 13, 14, 65 S.Ct. 16
(1944) as to the dual nature of the Court of Claims.
40 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (19II).
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terpretation-the element of "approval" in the second subsection will
in effect condition the outcome under the first subsection. If the act
is viewed in these terms, subsection (a) seems to contemplate a judicial
proceeding with the requisite adversity of parties (on questions of
materiality of the inquiry, procedural steps, etc.), while subsection (b)
seems to require what is in the nature of an administrative act. It is
doubtful that a witness would have standing to object to the approval
of a grant of immunity for himself. Although appeal from the district
court's decision seems to have been assumed in the debate on the enacted bill,41 Supreme Court review of a decision relative to the wisdom
of a proposed immunity grant may be foreclosed by the Muskrat case.42
It is debatable at any rate whether any discretionary act is to be performed. by the court under the terms of the statute. This problem will
be touched upon in section III below.
B. Distinction Between Purposes of Congressional Committees
and Regulatory Agencies. An argument based upon the distinction in
purpose between congressional committees and regulatory agencies
would seem to have little weight. Granted that a congressional body
is not charged with administering the criminal law and that its need
for an immunity statute may thus be smaller, still the courts place little
limit on the investigating power, and any statute which serves to advance that function within the limits of the Constitution is likely to be
held valid. 43 There is some force in the argument, however, when the
somewhat grudging decision in Brown v. Walker is considered. If the
rationale of the constitutionality of immunity statutes lies in a public
policy aimed at eliminating obstructions to enforcement of criminal ·
justice, which can outweigh the irregularity of substituting a statute
for a constitutional provision, it may be said that in the case of congressional investigations that policy is not so clearly served.44
41 See 100 CoNG. REc.
42 " ••• If such actions

12602 et seq. (Aug. 4, 1954).
as are here attempted, to determine the validity of legislation,
are sustained, the result will be that this court, instead of keeping within the limits of
judicial power and deciding cases and controversies arising between opposing parties, as
the Constitution intended it should, will be required to give opinions in the nature of
advice concerning legislative action, a function never conferred upon it by the Constitution,
and against the exercise of which this court has steadily set its face from the beginning."
219 U.S. 346 at 362, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911). It can be argued that congressional action in
granting immunity to a witness falls squarely within the language above quoted.
43 See generally, on the investigative power, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135,
47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
44 This is the argument of the minority of the House Judiciary Committee when the
bill was reported out. H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954).
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C. Substitution of Immunity for Constitutional Privilege. So long
as the Brown case remains good law, the substitution of immunity for
the Fifth Amendment privilege is constitutionally adequate. An argument based upon the reasonableness of the substitution alone would
necessarily run afoul of that decision. Since the time it was handed
down, the Court has tacitly approved it in cases where the issue might
have been raised. 45
D. Usurpation of Executive Pardoning Power. The argument
based upon usurpation of the executive pardoning power, raised anew
in the minority report of the House Judiciary Committee, seems also
to be foreclosed by the Brown case.46 Some language in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Mania may give
some small comfort to proponents of this argument. But that language
may well have been used as a verbal means of reaching the particular
end in that case.47
These are believed to be the chief constitutional obstacles to the
new act. Only the argument relating to separation of powers appears
to be serious enough to merit a more thorough examination than is
offered here.

III. Some Problems of Construction
One of the chief criticisms of the new act is the loose nature of its
language. It will be recalled that while the language of former §3486
covered only testimony before a congressional committee, the Witness
Immunity Act applies to two different situations-both committee
testimony and testimony before a grand jury or court of the United
States. There is some contrast in the substance of these provisions.
The approval of the attorney general is not a prerequisite to granting
immunity to a witness before a committee. Where the testimony is
45 See, e.g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 63 S.Ct. 409 (1943); Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1948).
46 It may be argued that a direct statutory grant of immunity, as in the case of the
regulatory agencies, is distinguishable from the instant legislation, which necessitates a
vote of the committee, and which is, in one sense, an immunity grant ail 1wc by that
committee. But this appears to be chiefly a verbal quibble, as conditions are prescribed
before immunity is forthcoming under either statute.
47 In order to justify his view that the privilege against self-incrimination had to be
claimed before the immunity could come into force, absent such a requisite in the statute,
Justice Frankfurter argued that these statutes were not statutes of "general amnesty," but
were aimed at the more efficient administration of criminal justice. 317 U.S. 424 at 436,
63 S.Ct. 409 (1943). This terminology-that immunity legislation is aimed toward
"amnesty"-was the rationale of the majority in Brown v. Walker when the usurpation-ofpardoning-power argument was dealt with. 161 U.S. 591 at 601, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896).
But see Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 33 S.Ct. 226 (1913).
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given in court or before a grand jury, the attorney general's approval
is necessary, in addition to an order of "the court." (It may be questioned just which court the statute refers to in requiring an application
to be made by the United States attorney. The section refers in part
to grand jury proceedings and so there is no necessary implied specification of the tribunal with jurisdiction in the premises.) In subsection
(c), the provision relating to courts and grand juries, specific criminal
statutes such as the Atomic Energy Act and Internal Security Act are
spelled out, as bases for grants of immunity, in addition to the general
grounds found in subsection (a), the congressional committee provision. Under these circumstances, the court may be faced with the
problem of whether Congress by implication intended to exclude from
the general area where immunity may be granted under subsection (a)
the specific areas enumerated in subsection (c). The problem could
be resolved by regarding the enumeration in subsection (c) as surplusage. At any rate, the difference in approach is puzzling.
A more serious problem is presented by the procedure set up in
subsections (a) and (b) for a congressional grant of immunity. It is
evident that the district court is to participate in the grant, but the
direction and degree of that participation is left somewhat uncertain. 48
Under subsection (a) an order "may be issued by a United States district court judge" requiring the witness to give testimony. No criteria
are specified upon which to condition such an order. Presumably, the
judge must satisfy himself that the committee has recommended a
grant of immunity and that application has been made for an order.
It can be argued that a showing of materiality of the question asked to
the investigation being carried on under the committee's authorization
would also be a prerequisite to such an order. But nothing in the statute itself requires this conclusion.49 The problem involving separation
of powers may thus be made more acute, since this subsection contemplates what seems to be a judicial (as contrasted with an administrative)
act on the part of the district judge, for a court order not supplementary to a judicial proceeding would seem to be an anomaly. But if
some element of controversy is introduced, e.g., the materiality of the
questions asked, then the constitutional injunction should be satisfied.
In subsection (b), it is provided that no immunity shall be granted
without notification of the attorney general and the securing of "ap48 Debate on the House Hoor did not reveal any greater degree of certainty. 100 CoNG.
REc. 12604 (Aug. 4, 1954).
49 Query as to whether a court order under the statute would be conclusive on the
witness as to the question of materiality if raised in a contempt proceeding.
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proval from the United States district court for the district wherein
such inquiry is being held." This requisite again lacks any clearcut
criteria for the action of the district judge. It may be questioned
whether his power is one of veto, going to the wisdom of the immunity
grant, or whether it is a formal rubber-stamp, designed only to prevent
hasty action by committees.50 There is also the possibility that the phrasing in subsection (b) is a mere repetition, in slightly different language,
of the procedure set forth in subsection (a). The sentence succeeding
the provision under discussion may aid the interpretation that the district court is to exercise discretion as to the wisdom of the grant of
immunity. It provides that the attorney general shall be given an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the "proposed application" for
the court's approval. If no latitude in regard to the wisdom of the
grant resides in the court, then the attorney general's opportunity to
be heard would be a rather empty one. It should also be noted that
whereas in subsection (a) the district court judge is specified as the
acting force, subsection (b) specifies the district court, apparently as
a juridical entity. Should the statute be technically interpreted so as
to emphasize this difference in terminology, then the constitutional
bugaboo raised in Hayburn's Case (a court is being required to do
an executive act) is somewhat more acute than if the judge were
specified.
There appears to be little change in substance from the type of
law upheld in Brown v. Walker as to the necessary broadness of the
immunity. The terminology seems largely to be taken from the regulatory statutes before discussed.
A further serious interpretative problem relates to the decision in
Adams v. Maryland. 51 It must be remembered that that case involved
a situation where state rules of practice (evidentiary in nature), and
not the administration of local criminal law, were forced to bow to the
supremacy clause of the federal Constitution. 52 Since the instant statute gives full immunity from prosecution (former §3486 prohibited
only the use of testimony in any court), it is highly questionable
whether the reasoning of the Adams case can be extended to its language. This is so although the pivotal language of the former statute"No testimony ... shall be used as evidence in any criminal proceedings against him in any court ..."-is repeated in substance in the
50 For a similar doubt, see the remarks of Representative Reams, 100
12608 (Aug. 4, 1954).
51347 U.S. 179, 74 S.Ct. 442 (1954).
112cf. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63 (1931).
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new law, together with the full immunity provision. It may well be
doubted that the national government has any power to grant -full
immunity from prosecution of an individual under state law merely
on the theory that such power is necessary as an incident to obtaining
testimony before congressional committees. The supremacy clause is
strong, but it does not go that far, because the effect of full immunity
would be to nullify state criminal law in the substantive sense, even
though state officers may base a prosecution on wholly independent
evidence. It might be proper to construe the new statute to mean that
evidentiary matters in state proceedings are controlled by the limitation
on the use of compelled testimony given before a committee or grand
jury, as decided in the Adams case, but that states are free to prosecute
witnesses for crimes revealed in their testimony if the evidence relied
upon is independent. 'The exact language of the statute, with the testimonial provision in a clause separate from the full immunity provision,
gives weight to this thesis. However, there must remain some doubt on
_ the matter until the Court has spoken.53
One more problem, chiefly a practical one, should be noted. The
language of the statute permits a grant of immunity as to the "transactions, matters, or things concerning which he is compelled" to testify.
The witness, as has been seen, must claim his privilege in response to
questions before committee action may be taken to grant immunity.
But nothing is directly provided as to the relevancy of his response
after immunity has been granted. Perhaps it may be presumed that in
later criminal proceedings a court may determine whether the revelation made by the defendant before a committee was germane to the
question or questions asked. But the statute might have been made
clear in this regard. Lack of express language in the act led some lawmakers to voice fears of a repetition of the "immunity baths" under the
- 1857 statute.54
It may be stated, in conclusion, that the Witness Immunity Act of
1954 needs definitive interpretation by the courts before either committees or witnesses can safely operate under it. The vague language
employed as to the district court's part in the immunity grant is susceptible of varying interpretations. So is the scope of the immunity
53 See the testimony of the Chicago Bar Association, quoted in the minority report of
H. Rep. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 14 (1954).
54 See remarks of Senator Kefauver: "The bill does not set out affirmatively that the
response must be germane to the question, and many of the feai:s expressed by the Senator
from Oklahoma [Mr. Monroney] might be well founded in the granting of immunity to a
dangerous criminal." 99 CoNG. R.Ec. 8349 (1953).
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grant itself in its relation to state criminal prosecutions. The narrow
field the statute embraces will at least limit the impact of the legislation
on congressional investigations and federal criminal proceedings.'"'

George S. Flint, S.Ed.

55 Constitutionality of the grand jw:y provisions [subsection (c)] of the statute here
discussed was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of
William Ludwig Ullman, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1955, p. 1:3. Appeal from this decision
is likely. Justices Frank, Clark, and Galston wrote separate opinions upholding the district
court decision holding Ullman in contempt after immunity had been granted and he continued to refuse to answer certain questions, 23 LAW WEEK 2393 (Jan. 31, 1955). The
court refused to adopt defendant's theory that the purpose of granting immunity was to
entrap him into a perjury charge. But all three judges e."\:l)ressed doubt as to the continued
soundness of the settled Supreme Court rule upholding such statutes, as first enunciated
in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). Clark, C.J., concurring, said:
''I concur but regretfully. For the steady and now precipitate erosion of the Fifth Amendment seems to me to have gone far beyond anything within the conception of those
Justices of the Supreme Court who by the narrowest of margins gave support to the trend
in the Eighteen Nineties." The more serious problems connected with subsections (a)
and (b), relating to testimony before congressional committees, were of course not involved
in this decision.

